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This paper estimates a structural dynamic life-cycle model of outmigration where, in each
period, immigrants choose whether to work in the host country, not to work but remain in
the host country, or outmigrate. The model incorporates several features of existing life-cycle
theories of outmigration but distinguishes itself by introducing uncertainty in about future
earnings and preferences which allows immigrants to revise their duration decisions through-
out their migration experience. Because immigrants simultaneously face a migration and a
work decision in each period, the economic assimilation rates commonly used to assess the
performance of immigrants in the host economy are endogenously determined and estimated,
a feature previously ignored in the literature. We overcome the problem of not directly ob-
serving outmigration movements by using panel attrition as a proxy variable and use a simple
method to correct for the fact that part of the attrition is not a consequence of outmigration.
Estimates are used to predict changes in life-cycle patterns of outmigration behavior. Estima-
tion results indicate that outmigration does not depend exclusively on earnings differentials.
Estimated assimilation rates are found to be robust to selection effects. Immigrants are found
to be forward looking decision makers, and simulations show that predicted migration dura-
tions are very sensitive to changes in their economic environment and differ considerably from
those of a myopic model.
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11 Introduction
The increasing importance of immigrants leaving their host country, which we refer to as outmi-
gration, is a world wide phenomena (see Dustmann, 2003 and the references therein). The case
of Germany is interesting as migration out of Germany has been particularly important in the
last decades. B¨ ohning (1987, p.147) estimates that ”more than two thirds of the foreign workers
admitted to the Federal Republic (of Germany),...have returned”, while Glytsos (1988) estimates
that of the one million Greeks migrating to West-Germany between 1960 and 1984, 85% gradu-
ally returned home. These massive movements of human capital pose substantial problems for
policy makers who must forecast inﬂows and outﬂows of immigrants in order to adjust their im-
migration policies to ﬁt the future needs of their labor markets. Moreover, it has recently been
argued both theoretically and empirically that estimation of existing measures of the economic
assimilation of immigrants based on possibly non-random samples of immigrants observed not
to leave the country (e.g. Schultz, 1998; Edin, LaLonde, and Aslund, 2000). For both these reasons,
a growing body of literature has investigated the motives behind outmigration.
Theories of outmigration typically build upon neo-classical static choice models of migration
(Sjaastad, 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970) by assuming that an immigrant’s decision to outmigrate
is based on the comparison of his current earnings and those of a potential new destination, often
assumed to be the immigrant’s home country. Centering the outmigration decision on earnings
differentials is motivated by the fact that outmigrants tend to have the lowest labor market perfor-
mance amongst immigrants in the host country (see Hu, 2000; Lubotsky, 2000 for evidence in the
United States, and Chapter 2 for evidence in Germany). Within the earnings differential paradigm,
outmigration occurs over time as immigrants improve their earning position in the home country
while being abroad by investing in home-country speciﬁc skills (Dustmann, 1994). Outmigration
is then triggered when the relative increase in the returns to human capital in the home country is
sufﬁcient for the expected earnings in the home country to exceed those in the host country.
However, there is empirical evidence indicating that outmigration does occurs despite persis-
tently higher earnings in the host country (e.g. Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath (1996)).
In order to reconcile these empirical facts, theories of outmigration have shifted from expected
earnings comparisons to expected utility comparisons between two destinations (Djajic and Mil-
bourne, 1988). This subtle change allows outmigration to occur despite having relatively higher
earnings in the host country, as long as the marginal utility of consumption is sufﬁciently higher
in the new destination than in the original host country. Several extensions of the expected utility
framework have provided new and interesting insights into outmigration behavior. In a recent
contribution, Dustmann (2003) shows that a neo-classical approach based on earnings differen-
tials has sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to explain outmigration. Using a life-cycle framework and assuming
that the marginal utility of consumption is higher in the home than in the host country, he ﬁnds
that migration durations may in fact decrease when earnings in the host country are high enough,
keeping constant earnings in the home country.
A different trend of the literature has placed the emphasis on explaining outmigration deci-
sions with non-pecuniary motives. The main reason for this shift has been the growing evidence,
mainly drawn from the sociological literature, which indicates that expected earnings compar-
isons alone may not be sufﬁcient to adequately characterize outmigration behavior. Among the
most frequently cited non-pecuniary beneﬁts for remaining in the host country are whether or not
the spouse or children of immigrants live in the host country, health and income satisfaction, per-
ceptions of being socially integrated and dependance of relatives back in the native country (Stark
(1998)).
The vast array of possible determinants of outmigration has yet to be integrated in a uniﬁed
2framework which allows to contrast the relevance of each potential explanation. The goal of this
chapter is to present such a framework. The role played by uncertainty will be a critical com-
ponent of such a framework. In most theories of outmigration referred to above, uncertainty
about economic outcomes is either not present at all or introduced in such a way that migration
durations resulting from an optimization process are deterministic: immigrants simultaneously
choose once and for all, at the beginning of their lifetime, their duration of stay in the host country
and the levels of consumption in the pre and post migration period. The prediction that immi-
grants do not revise their intended migration duration during their stay in the host country is
questionable in light of the considerable uncertainty immigrants face both before and during the
migration period. One important source of uncertainty concerns the difﬁculty in evaluating la-
bor market prospects in the host country. Pessino (1991) develops a model where an immigrant’s
uncertainty about his labor market prospects dissipates only after having actually migrated, a
feature shown to be sufﬁcient to cause outmigration. The idea that uncertainty is removed upon
arrival is intuitively appealing. Yet, it is difﬁcult to conceive that all uncertainty disappears upon
an immigrant’s arrival in the host country, if only because immigrants generally take up low paid
unstable jobs. If uncertainty is perpetually present all through an immigrant’s residence in the
host country, we would expect immigrants to continuously revise their migration duration in the
host country as their information set is updated through time, a feature not yet addressed in the
literature reviewed above.
Structural dynamic discrete choice models represent a theoretically appealing way to describe
a forward-looking decision maker facing uncertainty about the future. In this chapter, we specify
and estimate the ﬁrst structural dynamic discrete choice model of earnings, work and outmigra-
tion. In our model, forward looking immigrants make sequential decisions on work and out-
migration behavior in order to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility. Contrary to most
existing life-cycle theories of outmigration, we allow for uncertainty about future work and earn-
ings in both the host and home country all through an immigrant’s lifetime. The model introduces
this uncertainty while still keeping several important features of the life-cycle literature. Speciﬁ-
cally, we allow outmigration to depend on different marginal utilities of consumption and labor
market earnings in the host and home country, credit market rationing, and several other non-
pecuniary beneﬁts including feelings of social integration, income satisfaction, age at immigration
and whether the spouse lives in the host country or not. Given these elements are imbedded in
our model, we can directly test the validity of some of the motives put forward to explain outmi-
gration.
An additional contribution of our approach is that we endogenize the work decision of im-
migrants. This has interesting implications for outmigration behavior, as barriers to entry in the
host labor market have the potential to lower considerably welfare, thus making outmigration
an attractive option. Cohen and Ecktein (2002) estimate a structural model of job training and
labor market access and ﬁnd that improving access to the Israelian labor market gives Russian
immigrants higher welfare gains than increasing their potential labor market earnings. The extent
to which lower job market access is associated with outmigration has recently been addressed in
Bellemare (2003) who ﬁnds that immigrants in Germany leaving the country have a 30% lower
probability of working than immigrants who remained in the host country. Moreover, as will
be shown in the next section, explicitly modelling the work decision endogenizes measures of
immigrant economic assimilation to account for the possible non-randomness of the sample of
immigrants who remain in the host country, a fact generally overlooked in the literature.
This chapter also makes an important methodological contribution to the empirical literature
on outmigration. One of the main obstacles which has prevented the estimation of economic mod-
els of outmigration is the difﬁculty in obtaining accurate micro-level data on outmigration behav-
ior (see Dustmann (2000) for a recent discussion of this problem). Here, we develop an econo-
3metric framework which (nonparametrically) identiﬁes the conditional outmigration probability
in our sample without having to actually observe actual outmigration decisions. This approach
draws on previous work (Bellemare, 2003) and ﬁrst uses sample attrition as a baseline proxy vari-
able for outmigration. The probability that sample attrition is confounded for outmigration is
then explicitly incorporated in the model and estimated. We show that this is sufﬁcient to recover
consistent estimates of our structural parameters.
The model is estimated using 16 years of data drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) Public use ﬁle. The estimated model is shown to ﬁt the data well. Immigrants are found
to have a time horizon slightly greater than 20 years. The outmigration rate is predicted to be
approximately 3% per year, in line with previous estimates based on reduced form approaches.
Several explanations of existing life-cycle models appear to be consistent with our data. Speciﬁ-
cally, we ﬁnd that credit-market rationing, satisfaction with income, feelings of social integration
and earnings differentials have a signiﬁcant impact on outmigration decisions. Simulation results
show that for some immigrants, predicted migration durations are very sensitive to both changes
in returns and in the stock of human capital. Predicted migration durations are found to be very
sensitive to whether a myopic rather than a forward-looking model is used. Finally, we ﬁnd that
the estimated assimilation rates are robust to endogeneity of the work and outmigration decisions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the life-cycle model. Section
3 discusses the approach used to estimate the structural model. Section 4 presents the data used
in the paper and sketches the state of immigration in Germany and the historical policies that
have been implemented to favor and curb immigration ﬂows. Section 5 discusses the results and
presents simulations to asses both the performance and the life-cycle implications of the model.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Economic model
We have a measure of N immigrants in period t =1, where immigrant i remains in the panel for
Ti periods The control variables (d1
it,d2
it,d3
it) summarize the decisions taken in each period. An
immigrant can choose to work in Germany (d1
it = 1), not work but stay in Germany (d2
it = 1) or
outmigrate (d3
it = 1). When an immigrant works and stays in Germany, he enjoys non-pecuniary
direct (dis)utility d1
it and utility from consumption of his labor market earnings cit. The marginal
utility of consumption in Germany is denoted by qG. When he does not work, the immigrant
receives non-pecuniary direct utility d2
it, which reﬂects utility derived from leisure. Finally, we
assume that an immigrant who leaves the country ﬁnds work and receives direct (dis)utility d3
it
and utility from consuming his earnings, where the marginal utility of consumption in his home
country is denoted by qN.1 Each decision is mutually exclusive (i.e. d1
it +d2
it +d3
it = 1). We assume
that outmigration is irreversible which implies that the control variable d3
it acts as a stopping rule.2
Every decision is made at the beginning of the period and is based on the information set Wit in
1In this paper, we treat return migration and outmigration as equivalent concepts since most of the outmigration
movements are believed to be return movements. However, the model above does not rule out other departure desti-
nations.
2In our data, reversible outmigration is negligible (Pannenberg, 1998). In other countries, the assumption of non
reversible outmigration is not likely to be satisﬁed. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) ﬁnd that reversible outmigration of
Mexican immigrants living in the United States is particularly important.


































t=1. E denotes the expectation taken over the joint distri-
bution of the stochastic state variables (see below) and b 2 [0,1] is the subjective discount rate.
Equation (1) is maximized subject to the immigrant’s budget constraint, which is assumed to be
satisﬁed in each period, and is given by






it is the logearnings of immigrants in Germany, while wN
it denotes their log earnings inthe
home country.3 The assumption that immigrants do not save is admittedly restrictive. However,
83% of the immigrants in our sample used in the empirical part of the paper report having not
made any savings in the year preceding the interview, a direct implication of their inherently low
labor market earnings. Hence, the assumption that immigrants exhaust all their labor market




it in turn are allowed to depend on individual characteristics
d1
it = a10 + a11Sendcashit + a12Incomesait + a13Intfeelit (3)
+a14Educit + a15Experit¡1 + a16Exper2






it = a30 + a31Sendcashit + a32Incomesait + a33Intfeelit (4)
+a34Ageatimi + a35Wifeingeit + #3
it
Sendcashit is a binary indicator taking a value of 1 if the immigrant returns money to the host
country. In this paper, we treat this variable as an exogenous proxy for credit market rationing
which implicitly assumes that immigrants return money when there is an exogenous need for
liquidity in the home country. Ageatimi denotes the age at arrival in Germany, Intfeelit captures
sense of being a German, and Wifeingeit is a binary indicator taking a value of 1 when the wife
of the immigrant lives in Germany. Incomesait denotes reported satisfaction with income earned
in Germany. This is included in both the work and the outmigration non-pecuniary beneﬁts to
capture the additional utility accruing to ﬁnancial security which is not due to pure earnings con-
sumption. Educit corresponds to the total number of years of education, Experit denotes the total
number of years of labor market experience while Ysmit represents the number of years since
immigration. These human capital variables are included to capture disutility, or psychic costs,
associated with working longer in the host country. For a given level of income, higher educated
individuals will have relatively greater disutility from working in the host country if they take on
jobs associated with greater responsibilities. Experit and Ysmit are included to capture the possi-
bility that, keeping earnings constant, immigrants with relatively high labor market experience,
and those who have been in the host country relatively longer, may suffer greater disutility from
3Outmigration costs do not enter the budget constraint associated with outmigration, reﬂecting the fact that the
German federal government reimbursed outmigration costs from 1984 to 1992 (see Section 4 for details). We do not
model the regime change after 1992.
4A practical reason for not including savings and borrowing behavior in the model presented here is that this will
generally lead to a considerable expansion of the choice set and the state space which, given the associated computa-
tional burden, is beyond the scope of this paper.







consists of time speciﬁc
unobserved shocks to utility.
The earnings in Germany are stochastic and depend on the immigrant’s past and future deci-
sions
wG
it = j0 + j1Educit + j2Gspeakit + j3Unempit (5)
+j4Experit¡1 + j5Exper2
it¡1 + j6Ysmit¡1 + hG
it
These variables are standard in studies measuring the economic assimilation rate (Borjas, 1999).
We further allow the earnings of immigrants to depend on their reported speaking ﬂuency in
German Gspeakit, and on Unempit, the unemployment rate in the province of residence of the
immigrant. Section 4 will give a more precise description of these variables. The returns to human
capital and the province speciﬁc localization are captured by the j parameters while hG
it captures
unobserved stochastic shocks to earnings. It is important to highlight that the level of education,
the labor market experience and the number of years since migration affect the utility of working
in the host country via their direct effect on utility d1
it, and via their indirect effect on the utility
from consumption qGwG
it. In the former case, increases in the stock of human capital have the
potential to raise the disutility from work, keeping labor market earnings constant. In the later
case, increasesinstockofhumancapitalarelikelytoraisetheutilityofworkinginthehostcountry
by increasing the utility of consumption.
The earnings in the home country are determined by
(6) wN
it = g0 + g1Educit¡1 + g2Experit¡1 + g3Exper2
it¡1 + hN
it
where the g parameters capture the returns to human capital and hN
it is an unobserved stochastic
shock.
In any given period, Wit contains all state variables entering the earnings and the utility of









. This set is updated over time
as decisions are made. The two endogenous state variables, Experit¡1 and Ysmit¡1, have the fol-
lowing laws of motion: Experit¡1 = Experit¡2 + d1
it¡1 and Ysmit¡1 = Ysmit¡2 + Max[d1
it¡1,d2
it¡1],
with Experi0 = Ysmi0 = d1
i0 = d2
i0 = d3
i0 = 0. These laws of motion show that by endogenizing
both the decision to work in the home country (d1
it¡1 = 1) and the migration duration (d1
it¡1 or
d2
it¡1 = 1), the cumulative number of years of labor market experience and the number of years
since immigration are also endogenized. All other variables are assumed to be exogenous. This
implicitly assumes that immigrants are in some sense myopic and cannot foresee any updating of
their characteristics over time.5
As discussed in the introduction, endogenizing both the number of years of labor market expe-
rience and the number of years since immigration has practical implications in terms of measures
of economic assimilation. The most popular measure of assimilation (see Borjas, 1999) is usually
deﬁned as the differences in earnings between immigrants and natives with similar observable















5The most widely used alternative in the dynamic programming literature has been to assume that individuals have
rational expectations about the evolution of the exogenous variables over time. Manski (2003) makes a convincing case
against the plausibility of the rational expectations assumption in the context of individual decision making. Since it
is unclear whether we would be doing more harm than good by assuming immigrants have rational expectations, we
maintain through out the (restrictive) assumption that immigrants have myopic expectations concerning the evolution
of all exogenous variables.
6Endogenizing both decisions also implies that the assimilation rate (7) is endogenously deter-
mined by past choices. This can be seen by taking the the derivatives of the earnings equation as








= j4 + 2¢ j5Experit¡1 + j6
Both derivatives are direct functions of the returns and the level of experience. For immigrants,
increasing the number of years of labor market experience also has the effect of increasing the
number of years since immigration which is reﬂected through j6. Lalonde and Topel (1992) pro-
pose a very different notion of assimilation, which is taken to occur if, between two observation-
ally equivalent immigrants, the one with the greater time in the host country earns more. In terms
of our earnings equation, the Lalonde and Topel measure of integration is simply the coefﬁcient
of the number of years since migration j6. If accounting for the endogeneity of the work and
outmigration decisions affect estimates of the returns to labor market experience and to years in
the host country, we expect from (7), (??) and (8) that both measures of assimilation will differ
from standard linear least squares estimates. The size of the differences will depend on the type
and the magnitude of selection into work and outmigration. In the case where immigrant workers
who stay in the host country have expected earnings which are greater than those of a randomly
selected immigrant, we would expect their returns to labor market experience and to the number
of years since immigration to be biased upwards.
3 Estimation procedure
This section describes the econometric approach used to estimate the structural model presented
above. Our econometric approach assumes that outmigration is not observed, but that panel attri-
tion is. Given some distributional assumptions on the stochastic parts of the model, it is in princi-
ple straightforward to test different life-cycle hypothesis by estimating several speciﬁcations, each
obtained by maximizing the complete likelihood function which combines the choice and earn-
ings data in a single step. Given the numerical burden of estimating a dynamic programming
model, this direct approach is computationally demanding. In this paper, we use the three step
estimation strategy proposed by van der Klaauw (1996). In the ﬁrst step, a reduced form dynamic
programming model is estimated using the choice data. The parameter estimates of the ﬁrst step
are then used to estimate the parameters of the wage equations, controlling for sample selection
due to the decision to work and to remain in the home country. In the third step, a Minimum
Distance Estimator (MDE) is used to recover the structural parameters of the economic model. We
discuss in more detail each step, starting with the reduced form dynamic programming model.











into a set Uit containing all state variables
assumed to be observed by the econometrician. When incorporating the earnings equations (5)
and (6) in the budget constraint (2), and the budget constraint in the utility function (1), we obtain
U1 (Uit) + e1
it = a10 + a11Sendcashit + a12Incomesait + a13Intfeelit
+a14Educit + a15Experit¡1 + a16Exper2
it¡1 + a17Ysmit¡1
+qG fj0 + j1Educit + j2Gspeakit + j3Unempit + j4Experit¡1
+j5Exper2





= l10 + l11Sendcashit + l12Incomesait + l13Intfeelit + l14Educit + l15Gspeakit
+l16Unempit + l17Experit¡1 + l18Exper2
it¡1 + l19Ysmit¡1 + e1
it
7U2 (Uit) + e2
it = e2
it
U3 (Uit) + e3
it = a30 + a31Sendcashit + a32Incomesait + a33Intfeelit + a34Ageatimi
+a35Wifeingeit + qN
n






= l30 + l31Sendcashit + l32Incomesait + l33Intfeelit + l34Ageatimi
+l35Wifeingeit + l36Educit + l37Experit¡1 + l38Exper2
it¡1 + e3
it
where the vector l = [l10,l11,...l38]
0 is used to denote the reduced form parameters of the instan-













are have conditional mean zero and are independently distributed over time and individuals and
follow an extreme-value type I distribution.
The model presented above does not admit an analytical solution. Using the terminal condi-
tions and the distributional assumptions on the stochastic components of the model, it is possible
to solve numerically for the set of optimal decisions using backward induction for a given set
of reduced form parameters l and b. This is done using Bellman’s principle of optimality (Bell-




























t (Uit) + e3
it
¤´)
for all t = 1,2,...,T
where V
j
t (Uit) are value functions associated with choice j = 1,2,3. The value function associated
with the ﬁrst two decisions (j = 1,2) given the information at time t is given by
(10) V
j









where EMax represents the expected value of the maximal future value function, where expecta-







contained in the information set Wit+1. Finally,
the outmigration decision is a terminal control variable where the value function has the following
simple form
V3
















bj¡(t+1) (l30 + l31Sendcashit + l32Incomesait + l33Intfeelit + l34Ageatimi
+l35Wifeingeit + l36Educit + l37Experit + l38Exper2
it
¢
8In the ﬁnite horizon case, the solution of the value functions (10) are computed by backwards re-
cursion starting in the terminal period T. At every time period t, the goal is to compute V
j
t (Uit) for
every value of Uit that could enter the choice probabilities at time t or are needed during the recur-
sion in equation (10) to compute the choice-speciﬁc value functions in the periods t¡1,t¡2,...,1.6
The primary task is evaluating the EMax functions in equation 10. Given our distributional as-






















where x is Euler’s constant. Given we have solved the value function problem for each individual
and each time period in our sample for a given set of parameter values, it is straightforward to
compute the likelihood function. Each immigrant i is observed for Ti time periods. In each time







. The observable choice
sequence of i over all sample periods is denoted by di = [di (t),...,di (Ti)]. The sample likelihood









Pr[di (Ti)jdi (Ti ¡ 1),...,di (2),di (1)]¢¢¢Pr[di (2)jdi (1)]Pr[di (1)]
From equation (11) we see that the choice probability at time Ti depends on all past choices of the
individual, a fact which is reﬂected through the information set Uit. In this sense, the structure
of the model allows for a general form of state dependance across all alternatives. Given that the
Bellman equations have been solved for a given set of parameter values, and given the decision











t (Uit) + e
j
it > Vl
t (Uit) + el
it; for all l 6= j
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j
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t (Uit) + el


























So far, we have assumed that d3
it was perfectly observed. However, in most data sets including
the one which will be used in the empirical application, outmigration is not observed. Instead,
we observe the panel attrition indicator d3o
it which takes a value of 1 when the immigrant drops
out of the panel and 0 otherwise. Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) have shown that
measurement error of a binary left hand side variable can lead to severely biased parameters
and variance estimates in non-linear models. Because the dynamic programming model used
in this paper is highly non-linear, measurement error is a non-trivial issue. We deal with the
partial observability of outmigration in our data by extending the method proposed in chapter
2. The method rests on the idea that an immigrant who outmigrates necessarily leaves the panel,
6As is well known, solving the dynamic programming problem is computationally demanding. Optimizing the
likelihood function presented below took more than one month on a 2.66 GHz pentium 4 processor. On the other hand,
maximization of the likelihood function assuming immigrants are myopic agents took less than a minute.
9which suggests that panel attrition carries some information on outmigration behavior. To extract






















































the panel given that he remained in Germany, either working or not.7 The last equality in (12) fol-






= 1 whereby an immigrant who outmigrates will leave
the panel with probability 1. The parameter a3,12 can be directly incorporated in the likelihood










The procedure used above is motivated on the basis that the information on outmigration
behavior contained in panel attrition can be sizeable. The informational content of panel attrition
is summarized in the following Proposition




it = 1jUit = tit
¢













Proof. See Chapter 2
The Proposition shows that if there exist immigrants with observable characteristics tit such
that their outmigration probability is zero, panel attrition is sufﬁciently informative to nonpara-
metrically identify all the economically relevant outmigration parameters.9 As a consequence,
7This is closely related to the class of discrete choice models where the endogenous discrete outcome is either mis-
classiﬁed or misreported. See Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz (2001) for a survey of this literature. Our approach differs
from this literature as one of the realizations of the binary outcome is measured without error.

















it = 1[ d2
it = 1jd1


























it = 1[ d2
it = 1jUit
´
where we made use of the fact that Pr
¡
d1
it = 1[ d2
it = 1jd1




9Bellemare (2003) shows that the nonparametric identiﬁcation result also holds, with minor modiﬁcation, if a3,12
depends on observable characteristics.
10this identiﬁcation result justiﬁes the use of sample attrition as a baseline proxy variable for out-
migration.10 The assumption that there exists a subpopulation of immigrants with observable
characteristics such that the probability of outmigration is zero can be checked after having es-
timated the model by computing the predicted outmigration probabilities for each immigrant.
Intuitively, this condition is likely to be satisﬁed in countries where a substantial part of the immi-
grant population is observed to remain in the country. We will see in section 4 that more than 25%
of immigrants remained in the sample between 1985 and 1999. Results of Proposition 1 also sug-
gest that it is possible to extract the relevant outmigration parameters using some nonparametric
estimator. This approach is not practical in the present context as our main goal is to estimate our
structural economic model which is generically nonparametrically under-identiﬁed.11 However,
this nonparametric identiﬁcation result gives a sound motivation to the approach presented here
and suggests that parametric estimates of the outmigration probability should not depend heavily
on our parametric assumptions.
The reduced form estimates of the dynamic programming model are used to estimate the earn-
ings equation (5) correcting for selectivity due to work and attrition. Dubin and McFadden (1984)









is linear in #1
it,#2
it and #3
it, the conditional expected earnings of immi-






























































The parameters of this equation can be consistently estimated using OLS provided we have con-
sistent estimates of the choice probabilities which enter the selection terms (see van der Klaauw,















by estimates from the
reduced form dynamic programming model.
Finally, in the third stage, given consistent estimates of
h
b b,b a3,12,b l0, b j0, b t2, b t3
i0
´ b p, we can
obtain consistent estimates of the structural parameters y by using a minimum distance estimator
(Chamberlain, 1984). We deﬁne the MDE as
min
y
(b p ¡ g(y))
0 C¡1 (b p ¡ g(y))
10Several approaches have been proposed to identify and test for outmigration bias despite not directly observing
outmigration. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) heuristically document the importance of outmigration in the U.S. by
comparing the skill composition of speciﬁc cohorts over time. However, their approach allows to identify the direction
but not the magnitude of the outmigration selectivity. Recent attempts have tried to combine longitudinal and cross-
sectional data (Hu, 2000; Lubotsky, 2000). These studies face several problems, notably censoring of the earnings
records, representativeness of the sample of participants in the longitudinal data sets, little information on human
capital of migrants and partial observation of some key variables. None of these approaches allow to recover either the
conditional work probability or the conditional earnings of outmigrants.
11The degree of under-identiﬁcation in discrete dynamic programming models is discussed in Rust (1994) and
Magnac and Thesmar (2002).
11where the function g imposes on the reduced form parameters the restrictions speciﬁed by the
structural model.12 C denotes the covariance matrix of b p which can be computed using the esti-
mated covariance matrices and the outer-product of the scores from the ﬁrst two rounds (van der
Klaauw, 1996). The resulting estimate of y, b y




b y ¡ y0






where H = ¶g(y)/¶y0 and y0 is the true value of y.
We now brieﬂy discuss identiﬁcation of the structural parameters. The discount factor b is
identiﬁed from the assumption that time preferences are additive. The parameters of the earnings
equation in the host country are identiﬁed from earnings data. Given these and the fact that
because the utility of leisure is normalized to zero, reduced form l parameters are identiﬁed from
the choice data, thus qG is identiﬁed from the exclusion of Gspeakit and Unempit from the direct
utility of working. Moreover, the identiﬁcation of the reduced form l parameters also implies
that fa31,a32,a33,a34,a35g are identiﬁed. Identiﬁcation of the parameters of the earnings function
in the home country (6) would require data on immigrant earnings upon their return. Because
our data does not contain this information (see section 4), we cannot separately identify qN and





reveals some information on the coefﬁcients of the earnings equation of wN
it . More precisely, all
four qNg parameters are non-zero if and only if qN and the parameter g are separately non-zero.
Under the plausible assumption that qN > 0, the signs of the g parameters as well as ratios of gj
are identiﬁed.
Given the parameters which are identiﬁed, some of the existing outmigration theories can be
tested in a straightforward way. The neo-classical assumption that outmigration decisions are
entirely based on earnings differentials can be evaluated by testing whether the parameters de-
termining the non-pecuniary beneﬁts in equations (3) and (4) are jointly equal to zero. The hy-
pothesis that immigrants are myopic decision makers can be evaluated by testing whether the
discount factor b is equal to zero. The importance of credit market rationing can be evaluated
by testing whether the coefﬁcients of Sendcashit entering the non-pecuniary beneﬁts of work and
outmigration, and whether returning money has a net positive effect on outmigration can be seen
by simulating choice sequences (section 5). It is interesting to test the hypothesis put forward in
Dustmann (2003) which says that migration durations may in fact decrease if the earnings in the
host country increase, keeping earnings in the home country ﬁxed. This test is a simple compar-
ative exercise and does not require separate identiﬁcation of the earnings function parameters in
(6) and the marginal utility of consumption in the home country (they are taken as given in the
comparative static exercise).
4 Background and Data
The historical inﬂow of immigrants in Germany has never been stable. The period of post-war
adjustment saw a tremendous decolonization of former Soviet economies. For example, 12 million
Germans left eastern Europe by 1950, with 8 million coming to West-Germany (Zimmermann,
1995; pp.46). Between 1955 and 1973, the strong economic development across northern Europe
paved the way to an increase demand for labor and led to a large inﬂow of migrants mainly from
the southern European countries and Turkey. The percentage of foreign born workers employed
in West-Germany increased from 0.6% in 1957 to 11.2% in 1973.
12Examples of restrictions are l10 = a10 + qGj0 and l13 = qGj2.
12Bilateral recruitment agreements between Germany and Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portu-
gal and Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s reduced the migrants’ cost of migration considerably:
workers entered Germany with a one year working contract, they could not be dismissed dur-
ing the ﬁrst year, travel costs were reimbursed, and employers had to provide accommodation.
After the oil shock in 1973, recruitment stopped, but families and dependents of the immigrants
living in Germany continued to ﬂow in. In 1984, in light of difﬁcult labor market conditions, the
government issued a repatriation scheme which gave ﬁnancial incentives to outmigrate. Financial
incentives were amongst the main instruments. All workers who had recently become unem-
ployed could apply for return package which included a lump sum subsidy and an allowance for
each child. Access to these programs was restricted to certain nationalities and mostly immigrants
of Turkish and Portuguese nationality participated; see Dustmann (1996) for more details. In 1999,
the Nationality Act was amended with the objective to facilitate the naturalization of foreigners
entering the country and to adapt immigration ﬂows to the requirements of the German economy
(OECD, 2001). One immediate action of the government was to vote the Nationality Code in July
1999. This code attempts to make it easier for foreigners to obtain the German nationality.
The data used in this paper is extracted from the immigrant sample of the public use ﬁle of
the GSOEP and covers the 1985-1999 period. The sample consists of an oversample of immigrants
living in West-Germany coming from countries which had signed a bilateral migration agreement
with Germany in the 1950s and 1960s namely Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia13. Data
on speaking ﬂuency, feelings of being socially integrated, intended length of stay and remittances
where given in consecutive waves from 1984 until 1987. Starting in 1987, this information was
gathered every other year. In order to keep a constant time interval between observations, we
have chosen to keep the 8 waves of the panel where detailed information on immigrants was
available, each spanned by one year, starting in 1985 and ending in 1999. We restrict our attention
to males between 18-64 years of age during the 1985 and 1999 period. Excluded from the sample
are individuals who died during the observation period and individuals who gave incomplete
information on any single variable entering the empirical model in any of the 8 waves. This leaves
us with a sample of 732 immigrants starting in 1985.
Figure 1 presents the proportions of immigrants in the sample which were working, not work-
ing or left the panel in each wave from 1987 to 1999.14 Changes over time can be broken down to
three sub-periods. The 1987 to 1991 period saw the percentage of working immigrants increase
from 68% in 1987 to 73% in 1991. At the same time, the proportion of non-working immigrants
increased from 12% in 1987 to 16% in 1991. The movements in employment and unemployment
were matched by a general decline in the attrition rates, from 20% in 1987 to just over 10% in 1991.
The period from 1991 to 1995 is characterized by the general economic downturn which followed
reuniﬁcation. The percentage of the immigrant population working declined steadily to 58% in
1995 while the proportion of non-workers and the proportion of who left the panel increased re-
spectively by 8 and 6 percentage points. It is impossible to tell from this raw data whether the rise
in attrition, which occurred during this period of economic austerity, was caused by increasing
outmigration ﬂows or due higher non-response rates due to migration within the country. In the
ﬁnal sub-period (1995-1999), the proportion of working immigrants slightly increased to 63% in
1997 before declining to 58% in 1999, while the proportion of non-working immigrants increased
to 26% in 1997 before falling to 22% in 1999. As a result, the attrition rate decreased in 1997 before
increasing in 1999.
Table 1 gives variable descriptions and summary statistics for the 1985 and 1999 waves. We
see that the average age of immigrants was 39.8 years in 1985 and 44.5 years in 1999, a ﬁve year
13Immigrants of Portuguese nationality are not included in the panel.
14The 1985 choice data is omitted from the ﬁgure as no attrition took place by construction.
13increase over a 14 year interval which indicates that the relatively older immigrants left the panel.
The average number of years of labor market experience increased by 3.3 years over the 14 year
period, which is consistent with the fact that the proportion of working immigrants fell in the
1990’s.
Most immigrants migrated to Germany early in their productive lives, a fact reﬂected by an
average age at immigration of nearly 24 years, a ﬁgure consistent through out the observation
period, indicating that most immigrants were in the age to autonomously decide to move to Ger-
many. The average year of immigration in our data was 1969 in the 1985 wave, but increased to
1979 in the 1999 wave, indicating that the earlier cohorts are most susceptible to have dropped
out of the panel. As the earlier cohorts contain the migrants with the higher number of years
since migration in 1985, it is not surprising to see that average years since immigration increases
relatively less than the 14 year time span, passing from 15.75 in 1985 to 19.63 in 1999. Reported
feelings on integration in the German society and reported speaking ﬂuency improved over time
while health satisfaction deteriorated, the latter likely capturing an aging effect. Finally, 73% of
immigrants reported having a spouse living outside Germany in 1985 while as little as 1% still do
so in 1999. This severe drop can be interpreted in two different ways. First, spouses may have
eventually migrated to Germany during the time period. Second, it might be that immigrants
whose spouse was living abroad were more likely to outmigrate.
5 Estimation results for the structural model
The model was estimated by setting the time horizon, T, at 65 years of age. In this section, we
will compare two speciﬁcations, a myopic (static) model which sets b equal to 0 and a forward-
looking(dynamic)modelwhere b isestimated. Inthelatercase, b convergedtoanestimatedvalue
of 0.655, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, indicating that immigrants are reasonably
forward looking decision makers. Accordingly, we will focus our analysis of the results using the
forward looking speciﬁcation and make references to the myopic model when necessary.
Structural estimates and asymptotic standard errors of the myopic and forward-looking mod-
els are presented in Table 2.15 All parameter estimates are fairly similar across both models. Start-
ing with the estimates of the earnings equation in Germany, we ﬁnd the usual positive effects
of the number of years of education and labor market experience, and the concave relationship
between earnings and labor market experience in both the myopic and forward-looking models.
Furthermore, increases in the number of years since migration and improvements in the speaking
ﬂuency of immigrants have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on labor market earnings. Living in
provinces of Germany with relatively higher unemployment rates has a small but signiﬁcant neg-
ative inﬂuence on earnings of immigrants, reﬂecting the presence of labor market externalities.
Immigrant earnings are found to increase by 1.1% with every extra year spent in the host country,
which suggest that economic assimilation in the sense of LaLonde and Topel (1992) is taking place.
As we mentioned in the introduction, it has recently been argued that this and other measures
of assimilation may be biased due to the non-randomness of the population of working immi-
grants who remain in the host country. This hypothesis has up till now received little empirical
scrutiny. However, when assimilation is deﬁned along the lines of LaLonde and Topel or accord-
ingto(7), theimpactofselectioncanbetestedeasilybycomparingtheslopeparametersassociated
with the number of years of labor market experience and the number of years since immigration
of our structural model and the OLS estimator. The last two columns of Table 2 present OLS esti-
15The corresponding estimates of the reduced form choice and earnings parameters are presented in Table 5 in the
appendix.
14mates of the earnings equation. We ﬁnd that both the ﬁrst and second order terms of the number
of years of labor market experience, and the returns to an extra year of stay in the host country are
not statistically different between both models, which clearly suggest that measures of economic
assimilation, either deﬁned in terms of equation (7) or in terms of LaLonde and Topel (1992), are
robust to endogeneity of the work and outmigration decisions.16 Similar results were found in
the reduced form model of Chapter 2 which uses the same data. The main difference between the
reduced form approach of that paper and the structural approach presented in this paper is that in
the former case, selection bias was modelled as driven by correlated time persistent unobserved
heterogeneity across the earnings, work and outmigration behavior. In the structural model here,
selection is entirely based on observable accumulation of human capital factors.
We now turn to the estimates of the utility function parameters in Table 2. Neo-classical mod-
els of outmigration assume that outmigration is exclusively driven by earnings differentials be-




null hypothesis is strongly rejected. Increased satisfaction with income, higher feelings of being
integrated in Germany and sending money back to the native country all signiﬁcantly increase the
utility of working in Germany relative to not working but remaining in Germany. Sending money
back to the native country also has a signiﬁcant and positive effect on the utility of outmigration,
relative to not working. Because a12 > a32, credit market rationing has a negative net effect on
outmigration in the myopic model.17 Satisfaction with income is found not to affect d3
it, the utility
of outmigration relative to not working in the host country. Given that higher satisfaction with
income was shown to lead to increases in the utility of working in the host country, it is clear that
this will lead to a lower outmigration probability. Finally, psychic costs of working were captured
by including education, labor market experience and years since migration in the direct utility of
working. We ﬁnd that keeping earnings constant, the disutility from work in the host country in-
creases with the number of years of education, which can be explained by the fact that individuals
with higher levels of education tend to take jobs with more responsibilities, raising their psychic
costs of working. Similarly, we ﬁnd that the psychic costs quickly increase with the number of
years of labor market experience. Because the marginal earnings gain from an extra year of la-
bor market experience is small at high values of labor market experience while at the same time
psychic costs are at their highest, we expect that immigrants with relatively higher migration and
work experience retire progressively from the labor force. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the disutil-
ity from working in the host country increases with the migration duration. Because the increase
in earnings which accrues to one extra year in the host country are small, this suggests that the
outmigration probability may in fact increase as the number of years since immigration increase,
despite that assimilation, in the sense of Lalonde and Topel (1992), is taking place18. The marginal
utility of consumption is positive and signiﬁcant, which indicates that earnings differentials af-
fect the work and the outmigration decisions. Some other results of interest are that higher age
at immigration is associated with a higher utility of outmigrating, which could reﬂect that older
migrants have less time to integrate and establish solid roots and networks in Germany.
Turning now to parameter estimates of the earnings equation in the home country, it is im-
16Formally, to asses the impact of endogeneity on assimilation of the type deﬁned in equation (7) would require
using earnings equation parameters for Germans which are estimated using a dynamic model which endogenizes the
number of years of labor market experience. We leave this task for future work.
17The effect of credit market rationing in a dynamic model will be evaluated below.
18Recall that Lalonde and Topel (1992) deﬁne assimilation as the effect on one extra year of experience in the host
country, which corresponds to the coefﬁcient of the number of years since immigration entering the earnings equation
in Germany.
15portant to recall that without observations on the earnings of outmigrants in the home country,
the returns to human capital in the home country are not separately identiﬁed from qN , nor are
they separately identiﬁed from direct effects on utility d3
it such as those found to affect the utility
of working in Germany. However, under the realistic assumption that qN is positive19 and the
(a priori strong) assumption that the level of education and the number of years of labor market
experience in the host country do not affect the direct utility of outmigration other than through
earnings, the signs of g1,g2 and g3 are identiﬁed. If both assumptions hold jointly, we expect that
education enters positively (g1 > 0), while experience enters with the usual concave relationship
(g2 > 0,g3 < 0). If keeping earnings constant individuals with higher levels of education or a
higher number of years of labor market experience also suffer greater disutility from outmigrat-
ing, then estimated signs of the parameters may be overturned. We ﬁnd that education has a
familiar positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect on outmigration, indicating that more educated
immigrants have higher utility from outmigrating relative to not working but remaining in the
host country. However, contrary to what one would expect from a typical earnings proﬁle, the
relationship between the number of years of labor market experience and outmigration utility is
convex rather than concave. Starting from no labor market experience, the utility of outmigra-
tion is predicted to rapidly decrease as labor market experience increases, reaching a minimum
at 25.43 years of labor market experience. For an immigrant with labor market experience higher
than 25.43 years, the utility of outmigration progressively increases as years of labor market ex-
perience are accumulated. One possible way to explain this convex relation is that qN, instead
of being positive, is negative. If this were the case, we would ﬁnd that education has a negative
rather than a positive effect of earnings, which is rather unlikely. Thus, it is more probable that
the convex pattern reﬂects unidentiﬁed psychic costs/gains associated with outmigration similar
to those found in the direct utility of working in the host country.
Our inferences on outmigration behavior rely on an identiﬁcation strategy which allowed us
to extract information on outmigration behavior from sample attrition by introducing in the likeli-
hood function the parameter a3,12 which accounts for the possibility that attrition does not always
lead to outmigration. The estimated value of a3,12 is 0.102, which represents the probability of
attrition which is not due to outmigration. The difference between the overall attrition rate, of the
levelof17%pertwoyears, and a3,12, suggestsanaverageoutmigrationrate of6%pertwoyears, or
3% per year, remarkably close of the corresponding value reported in Chapter 2. The robustness of
this value to whether we estimate a reduced form or a structural model, or whether we estimate a
structural myopic model or a forward-looking model, is an indirect indication that nonparametric
identiﬁcation of this quantity holds. This belief is further reinforced by the simulation evidence
presented below which indicates that the majority of immigrants in our sample are predicted to
have an outmigration probability close to 0, satisfying one of the essential requirements for non-
parametric identiﬁcation of a3,12. To interpret the value of a3,12, it is useful to compare the average
attrition rate in our sample of immigrants with that of a representative sample of native Germans.
Table 3 is taken from Chapter 2 and presents the attrition rates per wave for both immigrants and
native German samples. Averaging over the sample period, we ﬁnd that the attrition rate in the
sample of Germans is 11.6% (per two years) and 17.2% in the immigrant sample. If the proportion
of immigrants leaving the panel but remaining in Germany is of the same magnitude to that of
Germans, than the difference between attrition rates would represent the average outmigration
rate. We do not have direct information indicating that immigrants have the same normal attri-
tion rate than natives. However, apart from outmigration and deaths, panel attrition occurs either
because individuals decide to stop participating in the survey project, or individuals move within
19The literature (see e.g. Djajic and Milbourne, 1988; Stark, 1998) typically assumes that qN > qG. Given our esti-
mated value of qG is 4.906 (see table 2), it follows that qN > 0 will hold.
16Germany and cannot be tracked by the survey institution. Clark and Drever (2001) show that im-
migrants in the GSOEP sample are not more likely to move within Germany than natives while
Pischke and Velling (1997) show that immigrants in the western parts of Germany live in regions
with a high concentration of ethnic minorities. Both results imply that, if anything, immigrants
are easier to track than natives; hence the proportion of immigrants dropping out and staying in
Germany should be of similar magnitude to that of Germans and suggests that a3,12 should be no
greater than 11.6%, which is what we ﬁnd in the data.
Before illustrating the implications of these estimates in terms of individual differences in life-
cycle patterns of outmigration, we ﬁrst present evidence that the model explains our data reason-
ably well. We do so by simulating for each individual 1000 choice sequences from the ﬁrst period
to each individual’s ﬁnal observation period. Yearly predicted proportions for each of our three
decisions were then obtained by averaging simulated choices in each period over all draws and
all individuals. The top panel of Figure 2 shows the corresponding simulated (S) and real (R)
frequencies of the choice to work in Germany along with the choice to stay in Germany without
working. We see that our model ﬁts the data well over our time horizon. Speciﬁcally, the model is
able to capture both the decline in the work participation and the associated rise in the proportions
of non-workers which occurred after 1991. The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the simulated and
real attrition rates together with the predicted outmigrated rate for each wave. Our model slightly
under predicts attrition in 1987 and 1989 but ﬁts the data well after that. The under prediction
at the start of the sample period is consistent with the fact that attrition rates for native Germans
were also higher in the ﬁrst waves of the panel (see Chapter 2), a fact which can be traced back to
the early survey methodology (Pannenberg, 1998). Finally, the predicted outmigration rate rises
from 2.5% in 1987 to 3.5% in 1995, at the peak of the economic downturn. Subsequently, the out-
migration rate is predicted to fall slightly from 1995 onwards, a drop which is consistent with the
stabilization of the increase in the proportion of immigrants’ unemployed.
5.1 Implications for life-cycle behavior
The estimates in Table 2 show that both the myopic and forward looking models yield very simi-
larparameterestimates. However, becausechangesinmodelparameterswilladditionallyperturb
the Emax functions entering the value functions of the forward looking model, and because im-
migrants are found to be forward looking, predicted life-cycle patterns may differ substantially
across both models. In this section, we perform some comparative static exercises to quantify
these differences. As the outmigration probability of an average sample immigrant is very low,
performing comparative static exercises on a representative immigrant does not induce sufﬁcient
variation in his migration behavior to appreciate the implications of the model. Instead, we take
as a benchmark an immigrant at the margin of moving and staying in Germany. He his deﬁned
as a 30 year old immigrant, who migrated to Germany four years ago, has 10 years of education,
8 years of experience, does not return money to his native country, speaks below average Ger-
man (4 on the scale from 1 to 5), is not married, has a reported satisfaction with income of 3 (on
the scale from 0 to 10), lives in a province with an unemployment rate of 8% and has average
labor market monthly earnings of 1000 DM in 1985. We chose a benchmark of 8 years of expe-
rience in order to be 6 years below the potential number of years of experience.20 In this way,
we model an immigrant who experienced periods of unemployment upon his arrival in the host
country. We simulated predicted migration durations from 1985 onwards by simulating 10000
choice sequences for our marginal immigrant from 1985 to the time he exits the country, using the
parameters reported in Table 2. We then alter successively either one variable or parameter and
20In this case, the number of potential years of experience are 30-10 years of education -6 = 14.
17compare the new distribution of predicted migration durations to the benchmark case.
Table 4 reports, for both the dynamic and myopic model, predicted total migration durations
(all durations include 4 years since immigration assumed at the start in 1985) averaged over all
simulations. The forward-looking model benchmark predicts an average migration duration of
14.95 years. We simulate a tax relief by permanently increasing the net average monthly labor
market earnings of immigrants by the lump-sum value of 100 DM per month. Our simulations
show that this tax relief increases the migration duration by 65.75% to 24.78 years, a consider-
able increase relative to the amount given. Integration policies aimed at boosting human capital
levels can take different forms. Governments can offer language courses to speed up proﬁciency
of immigrants, or they may offer training which could raise the returns to labor market expe-
rience of immigrants. Both policies are predicted to have sizeable consequences for migration
durations. Increasing speaking ﬂuency from ”Below average” to ”Very good” increases migration
duration by 71.51% to 25.64 years, which reﬂects that immigrants with better speaking ﬂuency
have higher expected earnings. Offering training courses which would raise the returns to labor
market experience by 25% results in average migration durations of 29.83 years, almost twice that
of the benchmark case. Alternatively, governments can reduce the barriers to entry in the host
labor market by offering internships or other programs aimed at increasing an immigrant’s la-
bor market experience. Such a measure is simulated by increasing the number of years of labor
market experience of our marginal immigrant in 1985 by 4 years. We ﬁnd that the migration du-
ration increases relatively less than all previous changes, increasing average duration by 34.18%
to just above 20 years. Increasing the satisfaction with labor income from 3 to 6 on the scale has
a surprisingly important impact on the migration durations, which average 30.22 years, 102.14%
higher than the baseline case. Finally, returning money to the native country increases migration
durations by 59.8% to an average of 23.89 years, which is consistent with the predictions of recent
models of credit market rationing Mesnard (2001).
The results of table 4 focus on the mean of the predicted migration duration distributions. Be-
cause our simulations put an upper bound of 40 years on the possible migration duration, the
comparisons described above may be affected by this censoring. Quantiles of the migration dura-
tion distribution on the other hand are robust to this type of censoring. For this reason, and also
because our empirical model allows sufﬁcient non-linearities with respect to accumulated labor
market experience, it is of interest to investigate how other points of the migration duration dis-
tribution are affected by changes in the economic environment. Figure 3 presents the distribution
of the simulated migration durations for some of the relevant cases discussed in Table 4. Inter-
estingly, the distribution of the migration durations in the benchmark case is split between very
low and very high durations. The migration duration probabilities decline rapidly between 4 and
20 years of stay in the host country. The probability that the migration duration lasts anywhere
between 22 and 32 years is very small. However, we ﬁnd a small increase in the probabilities
of having migrations beyond 32 years, and a 12% probability that our marginal immigrant en-
ters retirement age (after 40 years in the host country) while in Germany. The U-shape pattern of
the migration duration distribution is consistent with parameter estimates of the structural model
discussed earlier. There, we found a U-shape relation between labor market experience and the
utility of outmigration, which implies that both immigrants with the lowest and highest levels
of labor market experience have a higher probability of outmigrating. It is interesting to see that
the main impact of our comparative static exercises is to shift probability mass from the lower
hand of the distribution to the upper hand, wiping out middle durations. The probability that
our marginal immigrant reaches retirement age in Germany increases from 12% in the benchmark
case to a little more than 40% in the case of a permanent tax relief of 100 DM. The effect of other
changes are similar, all leading to substantial increases in the probability of reaching retirement
age in Germany. One exception concerns increasing the number of years of labor market experi-
18ence in 1985. We ﬁnd that this lowers low migration durations but increases migration durations
between 16 and 38 years, a change consistent with our parameter estimates which suggested that
immigrants with more years of labor market experience suffer greater disutility from working in
the host country, and lower disutility from outmigration.
The second column of Table 4 reports statistics for the same set of simulations, this time using
the myopic model. The magnitude and directions of the comparative static effects differ enor-
mously between both models. First, we ﬁnd that the predicted average migration duration in the
benchmark case are substantially lower, with an average duration of 6.19 years. This is consistent
with the fact that myopic immigrants do not discount future utility changes as their economic
position improves. Accordingly, we ﬁnd that a tax relief of 100 DM increases the average migra-
tion duration relative by 11.78% relative to the benchmark case, a little less than an extra year.
Improvements in speaking ﬂuency and returns to labor market experience have the same posi-
tive effect on migration duration than in the forward looking model but, again, of much smaller
magnitude (raising migration durations by 12.92% and 15.99% respectively). The most surpris-
ing differences between the forward-looking model and the myopic model concerns the effect of
increasing immigrant satisfaction with income and the effect of returning money to the native
country. While increasing satisfaction with income doubled the average migration duration in the
forward-looking model, it has a very small effect on the migration durations in the myopic model.
Similarly, while returning money increased migration durations by 59.79% in the forward-looking
model, they are found to increase migration durations in the myopic model by only 2.56%. The
shape of the predicted migration durations in the myopic model is also very different from those
of the forward-looking model. Figure 4 presents the simulated migration duration distributions
for the myopic model. The benchmark distribution is heavily skewed to the left, and the probabil-
ity of staying in Germany for longer than 26 years is in all practical sense zero. All other graphs
have a similar shape and make clear that the myopic model predicts that our marginal immigrant
would never enter retirement age in the host country, a clear distinction with the forward looking
model.
6 Conclusions
This chapter is a ﬁrst attempt to estimate a structural dynamic model of work and outmigration
decisions that immigrants make over their life-cycle. The optimization problem of immigrants has
the structure of a dynamic programming problem, which can be solved recursively by backward
induction. The model in this paper distinguishes itself from the existing literature by allowing
immigrants to progressively revise their migration duration decisions during the migration pe-
riod. Despite this difference, the model is general enough to incorporate several determinants of
outmigration put forward in the existing literature, namely differences in earnings and marginal
utilities of consumption between the home and host country, credit market rationing, feelings of
social integration and satisfaction with income. The labor market earnings of immigrants are di-
rectly incorporated in the model and estimated along with the choice data. The structure of our
model allows us to estimate several popular measures of immigrant economic assimilation while
controlling for sample selection biases due to the potential endogeneity in years of labor market
experience and years since immigration, both of which evolve over time according to past work
and outmigration decisions. We used panel attrition as a proxy variable for outmigration and
corrected for the fact that part of the attrition does not lead to outmigration by extending to our
dynamic programming setting the method proposed in the previous chapter. This allows us to
make structural inferences on outmigration behavior in conjunction with work and earnings de-
termination without properly observing outmigration decisions. The estimates of the model are
19used to predict changes in the life-cycle patterns of outmigration decisions due to changes in feel-
ings of being integrated in the host country, income satisfaction, labor taxes, and returns to labor
market experience. We estimate the model using the immigrant sample of the GSOEP, which con-
tains a rich amount of information on the social and economic well being of immigrants during
the 1985-1999 period. The model was shown to ﬁt the data reasonably well.
Our parameter estimates indicate that commonly used measures of economic assimilation are
very robust to endogenous work and outmigration choices. Part of the robustness can be at-
tributed to the low outmigration rates predicted by the model. Indeed, our model predicts an
outmigration rate of 3% per year, with very little cyclical ﬂuctuations across the time period ob-
served. We suspect that the magnitude of the endogeneity bias may be higher in data sets subject
to higher outmigration rates, as long as outmigrants are clearly selected from either the top or (in
the case of the current paper) from the bottom of the immigrant earning distribution. Because
estimates of assimilation rates can directly inﬂuence the development of new immigration poli-
cies, veriﬁcation of this hypothesis using other data sets within a framework similar to the one
presented here will be an important task for future research.
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm the hypothesis recently put forward in the literature that outmigration
is not entirely driven by earnings differentials. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that immigrants who feel
integrated in the German society, those who are satisﬁed with their income, and those who re-
turn money to their native country are less likely to outmigrate. The results of this paper also
highlighted the importance of incorporating the work decision along with the migration duration
decision of immigrants, a feature previously ignored in the outmigration literature. We found
that both immigrants with relatively low and high labor market experience have a greater over-
all utility of outmigration, which suggests a U shape relation between labor market experience
and the overall utility to outmigrate. The decrease in overall outmigration utility starting from
low levels of experience is consistent with increasing psychic costs associated with outmigration,
keeping earnings constant. The convex increase in overall outmigration utility predicted to occur
beyond 25 years of labor market experience is consistent with progressively lower psychic costs
of outmigration and diminishing returns to labor market experience in the host country. These
results are interesting given that most of the outmigration literature has analyzed outmigration
within an earnings differential paradigm which, by construction, orient policy recommendations
towards measures aimed at inﬂuencing the earnings differential between the host and home coun-
try. Clearly our results do not rule out the important role played by labor market earnings in deter-
mining migration durations. However, they do indicate that the shape of the migration duration
distribution is determined by past work decisions, indicating that much can be gained from an
analysis in which work decisions are endogenously determined. Moreover, the foregoing analysis
indicates that policies aimed at improving access of immigrants to the host labor market upon
their arrival may also play an important role in determining migration durations.
The bimodal shape of the migration duration distribution was found to be robust to realistic
changes in model parameters. Our simulation results indicate that changes in the economic envi-
ronment have strong repercussions on migration durations of immigrants at the margin between
staying in Germany and leaving, suggesting that small policy changes may lead these immigrants
to substantially revise their intended migration duration. Because immigrants in our sample dis-
count substantially the future, the impact of several policy changes on predicted migration dura-
tions based on a forward looking model are found to be much more sensitive to changes in the
economic environment as opposed to a purely static, myopic model. Moreover, the predicted mi-
gration duration distribution in the myopic model is unimodal, suggesting that immigrants at the
margin between staying in Germany and leaving would never establish themselves permanently
in the host country, a feature in sharp contrast with the predictions of the forward-looking model.
These results illustrate the need for a careful evaluation of immigrant subjective discount rates
20when discussing the impact of policy changes.
Finally, this paper has shown that the approach used to separate outmigration from attrition
performs well in the structural setting developed in this paper. Estimates of the probability of
confounding immigrants who leave the panel but remain in the host country with outmigrants
were found to be robust to the structural speciﬁcation, and gave practically identical values to
those reported in the reduced form model of Chapter 2, an indication that they are relatively
well identiﬁed. As several panel data sets follow immigrants over time but almost none of them
possess information on micro-level outmigration decisions, we hope that this paper is a ﬁrst step




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Parameter Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE
Utility of working in Germany
a10 Constant -36.176 9.709*** -38.640 7.923***
a11 Sendcash 1.041 0.111*** 1.089 0.119***
a12 Incomesa 0.441 0.022*** 0.449 0.023***
a13 Intfeel 0.186 0.042*** 0.211 0.043***
a14 Educ /10 -1.323 0.538** -1.254 0.394***
a15 Exper /10 0.594 0.484 0.599 0.452
a16 Exper2 /1000 -1.911 0.888** -1.766 0.802**
a17 Ysm / 10 -0.889 0.196*** -0.949 0.161***
qG Marg. utility cons. 4.624 1.344*** 4.906 1.086***
Utility of outmigrating
a30 + qHg0 Constant -4.229 1.712** -3.900 1.961**
a31 Sendcash 0.965 0.370** 0.784 0.324**
a32 Incomesa 0.023 0.086 0.059 0.070
a33 Intfeel 0.294 0.182 0.121 0.141
a34 Ageatim 0.795 0.379** 0.773 0.319**
a35 Wifeinge 0.442 0.258* 0.181 0.208
qHg1 Educ /10 6.578 1.257*** 3.252 0.971***
qHg2 Exper /10 9.611 7.753 -2.934 0.858***
qHg3 Exper2 /1000 -5.834 8.337 5.743 1.507***
Earnings function in Germany
j0 Constant 7.369 0.069*** 7.384 0.067*** 7.311 0.051***
j1 Educ /10 0.284 0.042*** 0.252 0.037*** 0.247 0.029***
j2 Gspeak -0.054 0.008*** -0.056 0.008*** -0.059 0.007***
j3 Unemp -0.004 0.002** -0.005 0.002** 0.004 0.002
j4 Exper /10 0.333 0.034*** 0.359 0.036*** 0.372 0.014***
j5 Exper2 /1000 -0.581 0.062*** -0.635 0.064*** -0.652 0.035***
j6 Ysm /10 0.112 0.011*** 0.111 0.011*** 0.109 0.010***
Auxiliary parameters
a3,12 Partial obs. prob. 0.103 0.028*** 0.102 0.028***
b Discount factor 0 - 0.655 0.302**
Log-L (step1) -3015.6 -3002.73
Distance MDE 0.078 0.074
Table 2: Minimum distance estimation of structural model. Asymptotic standard errors in paren-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Parameter Variable Estimate SDE Estimate SDE
l10 Constant -1.203 0.426** -1.804 0.543***
l11 Sendcash 0.999 0.112*** 1.045 0.121***
l12 Incomesa 0.428 0.022*** 0.435 0.023***
l13 Intfeel 0.108 0.044** 0.118 0.046**
l14 Educ /10 0.034 0.248 0.039 0.254
l15 Gspeak -0.191 0.061*** -0.204 0.063***
l16 Unemp -0.091 0.018*** -0.096 0.019***
l17 Exper /10 2.090 0.178*** 2.555 0.321***
l18 Exper2 /1000 -4.541 0.324*** -5.157 0.516***
l19 Ysm /10 -0.392 0.075 -0.442 0.078***
l30 Constant -14.467 19.806 -6.239 2.386**
l31 Sendcash 0.571 0.388 0.626 0.332*
l32 Incomesa 0.089 0.091 0.094 0.071
l33 Intfeel 0.275 0.182 0.166 0.143
l34 Ageatim 0.437 0.418 0.549 0.338
l35 Wifeinge 0.420 0.258* 0.147 0.209
l36 Educ /10 5.254 1.354*** 2.786 0.976**
l37 Exper /10 -1.505 8.529 -1.338 1.021
l38 Exper2 /1000 5.768 9.339 3.586 1.609**
a3,12 Partial obs. prob. 0.117 0.033*** 0.112 0.031***
b Discount factor 0 - 0.618 0.342*
Log-L -3015.6 -3002.73
j0 Constant 7.754 0.220*** 7.568 0.242***
j1 Educ / 10 0.229 0.045*** 0.240 0.037***
j2 Gspeak -0.054 0.008*** -0.054 0.008***
j3 Unemp 0.007 0.003** 0.007 0.003**
j4 Exper / 10 0.367 0.050*** 0.349 0.048***
j5 Exper / 1000 -0.669 0.102*** -0.622 0.097***
j6 Ysm / 10 0.126 0.011*** 0.126 0.011***
t2 Work selection 0.239 0.091** 0.169 0.101*
t3 Outmigration selection -0.038 0.009*** -0.044 0.009***
Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates of reduced form model. Asymptotic standard errors in

























































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Goodness of ﬁt of the model. Real (R) and simulated (S) frequencies of each alternative
over the 1987 and 1999 period. Simulations are performed by taking for each individual and each
time period 1000 draws from the extreme-value distribution. The simulations are obtained by
averaging over individuals and draws the predicted frequency of each choice.
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Figure 3: Simulated distributions for the forward looking model. Percentages are obtained by
simulating 10000 choice sequences and averaging the predicted migration durations over all se-
quences. Benchmark is a 30 year old immigrant, who migrated to Germany four years ago, has
10 years of education, 8 years of experience, does not return money to his native country, speaks
below average German (4 on the scale from 1 to 5), is not married, has a reported satisfaction with
income of 3 (on the scale from 0 to 10), lives in a province with unemployment rate of 8% and has
an average earnings of 1000 DM.
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Figure 4: Simulated distributions for the myopic looking model. Percentages are obtained by
simulating 10000 choice sequences and averaging the predicted migration durations over all se-
quences. Benchmark is a 30 year old immigrant, who migrated to Germany four years ago, has
10 years of education, 8 years of experience, does not return money to his native country, speaks
below average German (4 on the scale from 1 to 5), is not married, has a reported satisfaction with
income of 3 (on the scale from 0 to 10), lives in a province with unemployment rate of 8% and has
an average earnings of 1000 DM
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